We develop awareness-dependent subjective expected utility by taking unawareness structures introduced in Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2006 , 2008 as primitives in the Anscombe-Aumann approach to subjective expected utility. We observe that a decision maker is unaware of an event if and only if her choices reveal that the event is "null" and the negation of the event is "null". Moreover, we characterize "impersonal" expected utility that is behaviorally indistinguishable from awareness-dependent subject expected utility and assigns probability zero to some subsets of states that are not necessarily events. We discuss in what sense probability zero can model unawareness.
Introduction
Unawareness refers to the lack of conception rather than the lack of information. There is a fundamental difference between uncertainty about which event obtains and the inability to conceive of some events. In the literature, unawareness has been defined epistemically using syntactic and semantic approaches.
1 While epistemic characterizations are conceptually insightful, the behavioral content of unawareness remains unclear. For instance, a referee of a recent report on Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2010) wrote "It has become a folk wisdom among readers of this literature that unawareness is often nothing but another name for 0-probability belief. ... Is unawareness really nothing but another name for 0-probability belief? I don't know." Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2006 , 2008 ) introduced a syntax-free semantics of unawareness using state-spaces familiar to economists, decision theorists, and game theorists.
2 Instead of one state-space, it consists of a lattice of disjoint spaces, where every space in the lattice captures one particular horizon of meanings or propositions. Higher spaces capture wider horizons, in which states correspond to situations described by a richer vocabulary. In the present paper, we replace the standard state-space in the Anscombe and Aumann (1963) approach to subjective utility theory by a lattice of spaces. This is done because Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini (1998) showed that standard statespaces preclude unawareness while Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2006) showed that nontrivial unawareness obtains in a lattice of spaces. In this richer framework, we are able to characterize awareness-dependent subjective expected utility. We choose the AnscombeAumann approach not because we think it is the most natural one in the context of unawareness but because it is perhaps the most "standard" approach and starting point. Apart from the lattice of spaces, the setting should be entirely familiar and thus easily accessible to the reader. The message we like to convey is that unawareness structures lend themselves in a straight-forward way as primitives in subjective expected utility theory.
Acts are now defined on the union of all spaces and are interpreted as labels for actions. The interpretation of those label depends on the awareness of the decision maker and the decision maker may evaluate acts differently depending on her awareness. For instance, consider a potential investor who considers the act "invest in firm X". Firm X is a bundle of potential opportunities and liabilities that depend on the states of nature. Which of these opportunities and liabilities the investor has in mind is determined by her awareness 1 For a bibliography see http://www.econ.ucdavis.edu/faculty/schipper/unaw.htm 2 Apart from having a syntax-free semantics, Schipper (2006, 2008) generalize Modica and Rustichini (1999) and a version of Fagin and Halpern (1988) to the multi-agent case. The precise connection between Fagin and Halpern (1988) , Modica and Rustichini (1999) , Halpern (2001) and Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2006) is understood from Halpern and Rêgo (2008, 2010) and Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2008) . The connection between Schipper (2006, 2008) and Galanis (2007) is explored in Galanis (2010) . The relationship between Board and Chung (2009) and Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2006) is studied in Board, Chung, and Schipper (2011) . The connections to the models of Li (2009) and Feinberg (2009 ) are yet to be explored. of these events. An investor being aware of a potential law suit that involves the firm but unaware of a potential innovation that may enhance the value of the firm may evaluate the act differently than an investor who is unaware of the former but aware of the latter. 3 Preferences of the decision maker are defined on those modified acts, one preference relation for each awareness level so that the same decision maker at different awareness levels can be compared. Standard properties on preferences are imposed for each awareness level and an additional property is imposed that confines the perception of an act to one awareness level. An awareness-dependent subjective expected utility representation is then characterized in an embarrassingly straight-forward way. Indeed, the first positive main message of this paper for the applied economist may be that it is straight-forward to characterize subjective expected utility in unawareness structures. This closes an important gap in the literature as we do not know of any other choice-theoretic model that allows for non-trivial unawareness satisfying epistemic properties introduced in Fagin and Halpern (1988) , Modica and Rustichini (1999) and Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini (1998) . In the literature on choice theory, non-trivial unawareness is precluded due to the use of standard state-space or it is not known whether non-trivial unawareness obtains. In contrast, unawareness is defined epistemically in the literature on unawareness but no choice-theoretic characterization has been provided. This critique applies also to our own prior work. Originally, just epistemic properties of unawareness structures have been studied in Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2006) . Logical foundations have been provided by Halpern and Rego (2008, 2010) and Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2008) . Unawareness structures have been applied to speculative trade in Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2009a) and Meier and Schipper (2010) , to Bayesian games in Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2009b) , and to dynamic games and an application of verifiable communication in Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2010) . Yet, until now notions of utility and beliefs have been taken as primitives in those structures. The current paper shows that they can be derived from choices within unawareness structures. The second goal is to apply the representation theorem to analyze the behavioral implications of unawareness. Consider an outside observer who wishes to know from the choices of a decision maker conforming to the Anscombe-Aumann approach whether she is unaware of an event or not. It is shown that a decision maker is unaware of the event if and only if her choices reveal that the event is "null" and the negation of the event is "null". This distinguishes unawareness from subjective probability zero belief, for which the event is null but its negation cannot be null. Thus unawareness does have behavioral implications different from from subjective probability zero belief. The following example illustrates the point: Consider a potential buyer of a firm. Agreements on the change of ownerships of private firms may be very complex involving many pages of legal documents. It is not inconceivable that the buyer may miss certain important clauses and may not think about them when contemplating the transaction. In particular, the buyer may be unaware of a specific costly future law suit that the firm may or may not be involved in. Assume that the buyer can choose among two contracts. Under contract 1 the potential law suit is the buyer's responsibility. Under contract 2 the potential law suit is the seller's responsibility. Otherwise both contracts are the same in content. Being indifferent between both contracts is consistent with assigning probability zero to the event of the law suit. Assume now that a third contract is available. Under contract 3 the potential law suit is the seller's responsibility but the seller receives an additional compensation from the buyer in the event that the law suit does not obtain. Apart from this clause, the content of contract 3 is the same as the other contracts. Being indifferent between contract 3 and 2 is consistent with assigning probability zero to the event of "no law suit". Indifference between all three contracts is consistent with being unaware of "law suit" but not with assigning probability zero to either the the events "law suit" or "no law suit" because probability zero can not be assigned to an event and its negation.
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The third goal of this note is to explore to what extend behavior of unaware decision makers can be captured with probability zero nevertheless. We characterize "impersonal" expected utility that is behaviorally indistinguishable from awareness-dependent expected utility. The representation delivers a probability measure on the "flattened state-space", the union of all state-spaces in the lattice, that assigns zero probability not only to null events but also to any subsets of states (that may not necessarily be events) that the decision maker does "not reason" about. We discuss in Subsection 6.1 that probability zero per se can not model unawareness. It requires additionally the "rich language" of unawareness structures. But in unawareness structures, awareness-dependent subjective expected utility should be preferable.
Awareness-dependent expected utility may be seen as a step towards analyzing Savage's (1954) "small worlds" assumption. Savage (1954, p. 82-83) used the term for the space of states of nature to indicate the "...practical necessity to confining attention, or isolating, relatively simple situations...". Savage (1954, p. 16 ) felt that he "was unable to formulate criteria for selecting these small worlds...". While we can not deliver such a criterion either, my approach allows the modeler to analyze the decision maker in various sets of "small worlds" which are partially ordered by their richness. The representation theorem should be interpreted either from the modeler's (bird's) point of view as contemplating a decision maker's (admittedly counterfactual) choices at various awareness levels, or from the decision maker's point of view conditional on her awareness level.
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The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we present primitives of unawareness structures. In Section 3, we develop awareness-dependent subjective expected utility. 5 See Section 4 for a more detailed discussion of the example. 6 In an extended model with states of the world (as in Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper, 2009) rather than states of nature, i.e., in which states also encode the preference and thus beliefs of the decision maker, the decision maker at a given awareness level could also reason about her own decisions at lower awareness levels. This is applied to the problem of revealing unawareness in Section 4. In Section 5, we characterize impersonal expected utility and discuss its relation to awareness-dependent subjective expected utility. In Section 6, we finish with a discussion of probability zero, caveats and extensions as well as the related literature. All proofs are collected in an appendix.
Primitives of Unawareness Structures

State-Spaces
Let S = {S α } α∈A be a finite lattice of disjoint state-spaces, with the partial order on S. For simplicity we assume in this paper that each S is finite. If S α and S β are such that S α S β we say that "S α is more expressive than S β -states of S α describe situations with a richer vocabulary than states of S β ". 7 Denote by Ω = α∈A S α the union of these spaces.
Spaces in the lattice can be more or less "rich" in terms of facts that may or may not obtain in them. The partial order relates to the "richness" of spaces. The upmost space of the lattice may be interpreted as the "objective" state-space. Its states encompass full descriptions.
Projections
For every S and S such that S S, there is a surjective projection r S S : S → S, where r S S is the identity. ("r S S (ω) is the restriction of the description ω to the more limited vocabulary of S.") Note that the cardinality of S is smaller than or equal to the cardinality of S . We require the projections to commute: If S S S then r
Projections "translate" states in "more expressive" spaces to states in "less expressive" spaces by "erasing" facts that can not be expressed in a lower space.
These surjective projections may embody Savage's idea that "(i)t may be well, however, to emphasize that a state of the smaller world corresponds not to a state of the larger, but to a set of states" (Savage, 1954 , p. 9).
Events
("All the extensions of descriptions in D to at least as expressive vocabularies.") 7 Here and in what follows, phrases within quotation marks hint at intended interpretations, but we emphasize that these interpretations are not part of the definition of the set-theoretic structure.
An event is a pair (E, S), where E = D ↑ with D ⊆ S, where S ∈ S. D is called the base and S the base-space of (E, S), denoted by S(E). If E = ∅, then S is uniquely determined by E and, abusing notation, we write E for (E, S). Otherwise, we write ∅ S for (∅, S). Note that not every subset of Ω is an event.
Some fact may obtain in a subset of a space. Then this fact should be also "expressible" in "more expressive" spaces. Therefore the event contains not only the particular subset but also its inverse images in "more expressive" spaces.
Let Σ be the set of events of Ω. Note that unless S is a singleton, Σ is not an algebra because it contains distinct vacuous events ∅ S for all S ∈ S. These vacuous events correspond to contradictions with differing "expressive power". 
Negation
Intuitively, there may be states in which the description of an event D ↑ is both expressible and true -these are the states in D ↑ ; there may be states in which its description is expressible but false -these are the states in ¬D ↑ ; and there may be states in which neither its description nor its negation are expressible -these are the states in
Thus our structure is not a standard state-space model in the sense of Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini (1998).
Conjunction and Disjunction
λ (we will therefore use the conjunction symbol ∧ and the intersection symbol ∩ interchangeably).
We define the relation ⊆ between events (E, S) and (F, S ) , by (E, S) ⊆ (F, S ) if and only if E ⊆ F as sets and S S. If E = ∅, we have that (E, S) ⊆ (F, S ) if and only if E ⊆ F as sets. Note however that for E = ∅ S we have (E, S) ⊆ (F, S ) if and only if S S. Hence we can write E ⊆ F instead of (E, S) ⊆ (F, S ) as long as we keep in mind that in the case of E = ∅ S we have ∅ S ⊆ F if and only if S S(F ). It follows from these definitions that for events E and F , E ⊆ F is equivalent to ¬F ⊆ ¬E only when E and F have the same base, i.e., S(E) = S(F ). 
Probability Measures
Let ∆ (S) be the set of probability measures on S.
For a probability measure µ ∈ ∆ (S ), the marginal µ |S of µ on S S is defined by
Let S µ be the space on which µ is a probability measure. Whenever S µ S(E) then we abuse notation slightly and write
If S(E) S µ , then we say that µ(E) is undefined.
Unawareness
We follow the literature on unawareness and define an epistemic notion of unawareness that in the subsequent sections will be characterized behaviorally.
Definition 1 (Unawareness) We say that a decision maker is unaware of the event E if her belief is represented by a probability measure µ ∈ ∆(S) with S S(E).
This notion follows the definition of unawareness in a more sophisticated model in which states of the world rather than states of nature are considered. That is, states also capture beliefs of agents. In such a richer setting, unawareness of an agent may differ from state to state even within the same space. Unawareness operators on events can be defined and it can be shown that all properties on unawareness that have been suggested in the literature indeed obtain. See Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2009a) for details.
If a decision maker's belief is represented by a probability measure µ ∈ ∆(S), we sometimes refer to S as the "awareness level" of the decision maker.
Since S(E) = S(¬E) by definition, we have the following observation.
Remark 1 (Symmetry)
A decision maker is unaware of the event E if and only if she is unaware of the event ¬E.
Subjective Expected Utility
Outcomes
Let X be an arbitrary space of outcomes or prizes. We denote by ∆(X) the set of simple probability measures on X, i.e., the set of finitely additive probability measure with finite support (see Fishburn, 1970 , Section 8.2). For p ∈ ∆(X), we denote by supp(p) the support of p.
Acts
An act is a function f : Ω −→ ∆(X).
Note that different from Anscombe-Aumann acts, f is not defined on just one statespace but on the union of spaces Ω. This is interpreted as follows: Let's say an individual considers investing in a firm (e.g., the act f ). A firm can be viewed as a bundle of uncertain opportunities and liabilities. The decision maker may perceive only a subset of opportunities and liabilities depending on her awareness level that may be influenced by her prior experience or her reading of the "fine prints" of the share sales and purchase agreement. In our setting, the uncertain opportunities and liabilities are represented by lotteries over outcomes contingent on states, i.e. acts. Some of the opportunities and liabilities (i.e., events) may not be expressible in some of the spaces in S. That is, they are not perceived when having certain awareness levels. For instance, if ω ∈ S and her awareness level is given by space S ≺ S, then the lottery perceived is not f (ω) but f (ω S ). So an act denotes simultaneously more or less rich descriptions of those uncertain opportunities and liabilities . It is essentially a label of the action "buy the firm". Which opportunities and liabilities are perceived by the decision maker, i.e. the awareness level of the decision maker, will be captured by the preferences over acts introduced below.
For any event E and acts f and g, define a composite act f E g by
Note that different from composite acts in the Anscombe-Aumann approach, g is not only prescribed on the negation of E but also on all states that are neither in E nor in ¬E. Different from acts defined on a standard state-space, we have in general f E g = g ¬E f .
For any collection of pairwise disjoint events E 1 , E 2 , ..., E n ∈ Σ and acts
...f n En g denote the composite act that yields f i (ω) if ω ∈ E i for i = 1, ..., n, and g(ω) otherwise.
If f and g are acts and α ∈ [0, 1] then αf + (1 − α)g is an act defined pointwise by
We abuse notation slightly and let p also denote the constant act that yields p ∈ ∆(X) in every state in Ω.
Let A denote the set of all acts.
Remark 2 A is a mixture space. I.e., for all f, g ∈ A and all α, β
Note that we do not impose a measurability condition on acts in the sense that for any f ∈ A and p ∈ ∆(X), the set of states {ω ∈ Ω : f (ω) = p} is an event in Σ as defined previously. While such a measurability assumption may be justified in some applications, it may not be applicable in general. Consider for instance the example of a potential investor buying a firm discussed in the introduction. Contracts 1 and 3 are not measurable in the above sense.
8 A practical framework of decision making under unawareness should not rule out such examples.
Preferences
The decision maker's choices are represented by a collection of preferences, { S } S∈S , one for each space S ∈ S with each S defined on A. The preference of the decision maker with awareness level S is S .
For each S ∈ S, strict preference, S , is defined on A by S and not S . Indifference, ∼ S , is defined on A by S and S .
Preferences are allowed to vary with state-spaces. The idea is that an act f may be preferred over the act g at a certain awareness level but g may be preferred over f at a different awareness level. E.g., suppose to you prefer onions over any other food. Yet, if you were aware that an eminent expert suspects onions to cause the fatal disease cuppacuppitis then you may rank onions below some other vegetable.
Assumptions on Preferences
The following five well known properties are standard in the Anscombe-Aumann approach, but adapted here to the lattice of state-spaces.
Property 1 (Weak Order) For all S ∈ S, S is complete and transitive.
Property 2 (Archimedean Continuity) For all S ∈ S and f, g, h ∈ A, if f S g S h, then there exists α, β ∈ (0, 1) such that αf
This definition generalizes Savage's notion of null-event to our structure. We will show that it captures "events conceived but assigned probability zero" rather than "events not conceived of". We think that indeed this is in the spirit of Savage's notion of null-event because in Savage "events not conceived of" are simply not considered in the decision maker's small world.
Remark 3 For each S ∈ S:
(i) For any event F with S(F ) S, F is neither S-null nor S-nonnull.
(ii) ∅ S is S-null if and only if S S.
Property 4 (Nondegeneracy) For all S ∈ S there exist f, g ∈ A such that f S g.
If the decision maker has preference S , then the following property suggests the interpretation that she has "awareness level" S. This property is trivially satisfied in standard state-space models. Yet, it is key in the current approach.
The examples in Figure 1 illustrate Property 6. There are only two spaces, S 1 and S 2 . Different shades represent different outcomes. For instance, the left structure in Figure 1 , the left composite act yields "grey" in state ω 1 but "white" in states ω 2 and ω 3 . If the decision maker's awareness level is given by the lower space S 2 , then she does not care what happens in the upper space because she is unaware of those events. The right structure of Figure 1 illustrates that if the decision maker's awareness level is given by the upper space S 1 , then she cares only about states in S 1 . She neglects whatever happens in lower spaces presumably because she fully understands that she is aware.
Remark 4 Property 6 implies: For all events E, if S(E) S, then 
Remark 5 Properties 1 and 6 imply if S S, then f S ↑ g S h S ↑ g if and only if f S h.
Remark 6 Properties 1, 4, and 6 imply that for each S ∈ S there exists a state ω ∈ S that is S-nonnull.
Awareness-Dependent Subjective Expected Utility
Definition 3 (ASEU) We say that { S } S∈S admits an awareness-dependent subjective expected utility (ASEU) representation if there exists a collection of nonconstant von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions {u S : X −→ R} S∈S and a collection of probability measures {µ S ∈ ∆(S)} S∈S such that for all S ∈ S and f, g ∈ A,
f S g if and only if
and µ S ({ω}) = 0 if and only if ω is S-null.
Moreover, if there exists another collection of von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions {v S : X −→ R} S∈S and a collection of probability measures {ν S ∈ ∆(S)} S∈S , then for any S ∈ S there are constants a S > 0 and b S such that v S (x) = a S u S (x) + b S and ν S = µ S .
The specification outlined so far allows me to apply the Anscombe and Aumann (1963) approach to each S ∈ S separately to prove in the appendix the following result.
Theorem 1 (Representation) { S } S∈S admits an awareness-dependent subjective expected utility representation if and only if it satisfies Properties 1 to 6.
Definition 4 An awareness-dependent subjective expected utility representation has awarenessindependent utilities if for all S, S ∈ S there exist constants a S S > 0 and b S S such that u S = a S S u S + b S S .
If an awareness-dependent subjective expected utility representation has awarenessindependent utilities, then the utility function u S at awareness level S is also a utility function for any awareness level S ∈ S because conditional on each awareness level, utilities are unique up to affine transformations. We believe that in reality this may not be satisfied except in rather special cases.
Property 7 (Awareness-Independent Ranking) For p, q ∈ ∆(X), p S q if and only if p S q for all S , S ∈ S.
Proposition 1 { S } S∈S admits an awareness-dependent subjective expected utility representation with awareness-independent utilities if and only if it satisfies Properties 1 to 7.
Revealed Unawareness
In this section, we want to apply the representation to "reveal" a decision maker's unawareness of an event. Suppose an outside observer wishes to infer from choices of a decision maker whether she is unaware of an event E or not. The outside observer does not know the preferences of the decision maker nor does he know which preference relation is related to which awareness level (the mapping from state-spaces to binary relations over acts). All he knows is that the choices of the decision maker are summarized by one preference relation in { S } S∈S satisfying Properties 1 to 6. We denote by the observed choices and define ≺ and ∼ as usual.
The following proposition summarizes the behavioral implications of unawareness.
Proposition 2 (Revealed Unawareness) Let { S } S∈S satisfy Properties 1 to 6. A decision maker is unaware of the event E if and only if for all events F with S(F ) = S(E),
We may take the characterization of Proposition ?? as a behavioral definition of unawareness and call it revealed unawareness.
Consider now an outside observer who wishes to infer from choices of a decision maker whether she attaches subjective probability zero belief to the event E or whether she is unaware of the event E. We say that the decision maker ascribes subjective probability zero to the event E if in the representation of Definition 3, µ S (E) = 0 for some S S(E). The following proposition states the different behavioral implications of unawareness and subjective probability zero belief. With the structure in place, the proof is straight-forward. (i) Unawareness: A decision maker is unaware of the event E if and only if f E g ∼ h E g and f ¬E g ∼ h ¬E g for all f, g, h ∈ A.
(ii) Subjective Probability Zero Belief: A decision maker ascribes subjective probability zero to the event E if and only if f E g ∼ h E g and not f ¬E g ∼ h ¬E g for all f, g, h ∈ A.
A decision maker is unaware of an event E if and only if she considers both E and the negation of E to be "null". This is different from assigning subjective probability zero to the event E which is characterized by considering E to be null but the negation of E to be nonnull.
Recall the example from the introduction in which a potential investor may buy a firm using one of three contracts. The investor may or may not aware of a potential law suit involving the firm. The contracts differ in the "fine prints" with respect to this law suit. The three contracts are represented in the three graphics of Figure 2 . Each describes the money payoffs to the buyer in the event of law suit, , not law suit, ¬ , (in the upper space) and the status quo payoff of the buyer when she does not think about law suit, ∅, (in the lower space).
9 For a buyer conforming with awareness-dependent expected utility, indifference among all contracts is consistent with being unaware of , i.e. having the preference relation S ∅ . But it is inconsistent with the event E or ¬E being null. 
Impersonal Expected Utility
In what sense could a probability zero approach "model" behavior under unawareness nevertheless?
Given a lattice of spaces S, we follow Heifetz, Meier and Schipper (2009) in defining the flattened state-space associated with S simply by the union of all spaces, Ω = S∈S S. Note that the set of all subsets 2 Ω may contain elements that are not events in the unawareness structure (unless the lattice is trivially a singleton). That is, typically Σ 2 Ω .
A probability measure µ S on S is extended to a probability measure ϕ S on the flattened state-space Ω by
Note that Ω is just a standard state-space. The probability measure is extended by assigning probability zero to all subsets of Ω that are "not reasoned" about by the decision maker. Such subsets may not be events in the unawareness structure.
Consider a composite act of the form
Although {ω} may not be an event in the unawareness structure, we still have f {ω} g ∈ A since for every f, g ∈ A we can define h ∈ A such that h(ω) = f (ω) and h(ω ) = g(ω ) for ω = ω. f {ω} g = h {ω} ↑ g and h {ω} ↑ g ∈ A.
The following remark characterizes "null" in the flattened state-space by S-null or unawareness.
Remark 7 Properties 1 and 6 imply that f {ω} g ∼ S h {ω} g for all f, g, h ∈ A if and only if ω ∈ Ω is S-null or ω / ∈ S.
Definition 5 (IEU)
We say that { S } S∈S admits an impersonal expected utility (IEU) representation if there exists a collection of nonconstant von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions {u S : X −→ R} S∈S and a collection of probability measures {ϕ S ∈ ∆(Ω)} S∈S such that for all f, g ∈ A,
and ϕ S ({ω}) = 0 if and only if ω is S-null or ω / ∈ S.
Moreover, if there exists another collection of von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions {v S : X −→ R} S∈S and a collection of probability measures {φ S ∈ ∆(Ω)} S∈S , then for any S ∈ S there are constants a S > 0 and b S such that v S (x) = a S u S (x) + b S and φ S = ϕ S .
Compared to awareness-dependent subjective expected utility, we integrate over the union of spaces Ω and use the extended probability measure ϕ S in impersonal expected utility. Moreover, for any state ω that is not "reasoned about" by the decision maker with the awareness level S, the extended probability measure ϕ S assigns probability zero as well.
Theorem 2 (Characterization) { S } S∈S admits an impersonal expected utility representation if and only if it satisfies Properties 1 to 6.
Corollary 1 { S } S∈S admits an impersonal expected utility representation if and only if it admits an awareness-dependent subjective expected utility representation.
Corollary 2 Let { S } S∈S satisfy Properties 1 to 6. Denote by {µ S ∈ ∆(S)} S∈S the collection of subjective probability measures from the awareness-dependent subjective expected utility representation of S , and by {ϕ S ∈ ∆(Ω)} S∈S the collection of probability measures from the impersonal representation of S . Then for any S ∈ S, µ S (E) = ϕ S (E) for all events E ∈ Σ with S(E) S.
Discussions
Can we model unawareness with probability zero?
Both, Theorems 1 and 2, provide characterizations of Properties 1 to 6. In Section 4 we showed that unawareness is behaviorally distinct from null. In the awareness-dependent subjective expected utility representation of Theorem 1, null is captured by probability zero and revealed unawareness is captured by undefined probability. This is in contrast to the impersonal expected utility representation of Theorem 2 that must represent both null and revealed unawareness with probability zero.
Suppose we want to model a the decision maker who is unaware of an event E. Under impersonal expected utility, if the decision maker is unaware of the event E, then she assigns probability zero to it. But zero probability is just a necessary condition. A necessary and sufficient condition would be that probability zero is assigned to the event E and probability zero is assigned to the negation of the event, ¬E. But to model this, we would be required to consider negation as defined in Subsection 2.4 and thus (the special event structure of) unawareness structures. Thus, probability zero alone won't allow us to model unawareness and we are required to consider unawareness structures. However, using the unawareness structure in the first place makes the impersonal expected utility approach obsolete since every behavior that can be captured in impersonal expected utility theory can also be captured in awareness-dependent expected utility but latter yields the advantage of clearly distinguishing between revealed unawareness and null in the representation. This should be practical in applications where we work with representations rather than with (properties of) preferences.
It has been argued in game theory that a "good" model should model the relevant factor as perceived by the decision maker (Rubinstein, 1991) . However, note that probability measures in impersonal expected utility can not be interpreted as a "personal" or "subjective" probabilities of the decision maker. (Hence, the attribute "impersonal".) Statements like "I am assigning probability zero to the event E because I am unaware of it" are nonsensical since the very statement implies that I think about the event E.
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Historically, it was precisely the goal of subjective expected utility theory to make sense of statements like "I find the event E more likely than the event F " (see for instance Savage, 1954, p. 27) . For me the attraction of subjective expected utility theory is that choices provide a window into the decision maker's reasoning. This attraction is lost with impersonal expected utility but not with awareness-dependent expected utility. In the latter representation, it makes sense to interpret the probability measures as "personal" or "subjective" beliefs of a decision maker given her awareness level. In contrast, the probability measures in impersonal expected utility can only be interpreted as an artificial construct ascribed to the decision maker by an outside modeler. The issue here is more severe than the usual "as if" assumption in decision theory. In subjective expected utility, the decision maker may not really reason with the subjective probabilities ascribed to her by her choices. But it is not impossible that she could use them for reasoning. In impersonal expected utility, it is impossible that the decision maker uses herself such impersonal probabilities and at the same time be unaware of some events. 
Caveat
Property 6 implies that the events f which the decision maker is unaware of do not affect her ranking of acts. This holds even for composite acts conditioned on events that the decision maker is unaware of. More generally, it rules out that a decision maker becomes aware of an event merely from facing an act. While this is also the implicit assumption in standard decision theory (i.e., different acts do change the subset of "small worlds" that a decision maker pays attention to), it may be unrealistic in some situations. Sometimes, when facing an act, a decision maker may become in very subtle ways a bit more careful with the "fine prints" of acts, and this care may lead her to become aware of events. E.g., a buyer facing a decision about whether or not to buy a certain insurance contract may become aware of events that she was previously unaware of when reading all the fine prints of the contract. If ex ante an outside observer does not know how acts affect the awareness of a decision maker, can he still elicit whether or not a decision maker is unaware of an event?
10 Indeed, one of the epistemic properties of unawareness (in a model with states of the world rather than with states of nature) is that if a decision maker is aware that she is unaware of the event E then she is aware of the event E. This is AU-introspection in Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini (1998). It obtains in unawareness structures, see Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2009, Proposition 3).
11 This is not surprising since (in a model with states of the world rather than with states of nature) the impossibility result by Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini (1998) applies because the flattened state-space is a standard state-space.
To answer this question, we could consider a modified framework in which acts may influence the awareness of a decision maker. When an outside observer presents the decision maker with acts, he may change the decision maker's awareness. So in this sense, the outside observer may destroy the unawareness of the decision maker with the experiment to measure it. While this weakens substantially the usefulness of the approach to reveal unawareness of events, it still allows the outside observer to measure sometimes at least whether or not a decision maker was unaware of some events ex ante (i.e., before the experiment). For instance, in this framework we may observe a sequence of choices f g, g h and h f that constitute a cycle. The reason is that when the decision maker faced act h, she became aware of an event that led her to evaluate acts differently from the time she faced the choice between f and g. But without further assumptions, the outside observer can not draw inferences with regard to which event(s) the decision maker has been unaware of. Moreover, after observing h f , when the outside observer lets the decision maker choose again between f and g for a second time, the outside observe should observe g f . 12 That is, in this setting arbitrary choice cycles are still ruled out and limited to one-time cycles.
Related Literature
Li (2008) analyzes in a different model unawareness versus zero probability. Her study is a bit more ambitious than mine as she considers a two-period model in which an initially unaware decision maker becomes aware in the second period. The decision maker chooses among bets defined on her first period "subjective" states. This requires her to specify how those "subjective bets" correspond to "objective" bets in the second period. In contrast, in my model acts are defined already on all states although the decision maker may have a limited understanding of them. Li (2008) considers various specifications, including one in which unawareness of an event may be though of "as if" the decision maker believes that the event does not obtain.
Ahn and Ergin (2010) study framing that may also be due to lack of awareness. They take more or less fine partitions of a state-space as the primitive. Since the set of all partitions forms a lattice, we believe that their analysis could be "translated" into unawareness structures. In their approach, acts are defined to be measurable with respect to some of the partitions. When a decision maker faces an act that is measurable with respect to some partition, then she evaluates the act on at least the events of that partition. Intuitively, they assume that a decision maker always reads the "fine prints" of an act presented. This is important for their aim of studying how decisions are affected by framing through acts. It is in contrast to my approach taken in Section 3 because -translated into their approach -we define acts on all partitions simultaneously. One interesting feature of their representation is a (not necessarily additive) set function from which the partition-dependent probability measure is defined. It allows them to relate beliefs across partitions. They discuss various interpretations of this set function. In particular, their approach is an extension and axiomatization of support theory in psychology.
Ahn and Ergin's (2010) notion of "completely overlooked" differs from the notion of (propositional) unawareness in the epistemic literature. It is consistent with their model that an event is "completely overlooked" while its negation is not. This is in contrast with the symmetry property of unawareness: if a decision maker can reason about the negation of an event, then she can reason about the event (and vice versa).
Grant and Quiggin (2008) study in a dynamic model under which conditions decisions taken by a decision maker within her "small worlds" are optimal also when being fully aware. While those conditions are quite stringent, the question is meaningful from a paternalistic point of view.
Finally, Blume, Easley, and Halpern (2009) take a syntactic approach to subjective expected utility theory in which primitives in standard subjective expected utility theory such as the state-space, outcome space, and acts are replaced by syntactic descriptions. This requires a modified set of properties which are used to characterize subjective expected utility theory including the primitives. It is intriguing to extend their approach to unawareness structures.
A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Remark 4
(i) If S(E) S, then f E g(ω) = g(ω) for all ω ∈ S for all f, g ∈ A. Hence by Property 6, f E g ∼ S g for all f, g ∈ A.
(ii) If S(E) S, then f E g(ω) = h E g(ω) for all ω ∈ S. Hence by Property 6, f E g ∼ S h E g. Since S(E) = S(¬E), we have by analogous arguments f ¬E g ∼ S h ¬E g.
A.2 Proof of Remark 5
If
Hence by Property 6 and transitivity (Property 1),
A.3 Proof of Remark 6
Assume that Properties 1, 4, and 6 hold, and suppose by contradiction that for some S ∈ S all states in S are S-null. Since S is finite, number states 1, ..., |S|. Then for all
the last ∼ S follows from Property 6. By transitivity (Property 1), we have g ∼ S h for all g, h ∈ A, a contradiction to Property 4.
A.4 Proof of Remark 7
"⇐": If ω / ∈ S, then f {ω} g(ω ) = g(ω ) = h {ω} g(ω ) for all ω ∈ S and all f, g, h ∈ A. Thus by Property 6, f {ω} g ∼ S h {ω} g for all f, g, h ∈ A.
State ω being S-null means S({ω}
for all ω ∈ S and all f, g, h ∈ A. By Property 6, f {ω} g ∼ S f {ω} ↑ g and h {ω} g ∼ S h {ω} ↑ g for all f, g, h ∈ A. Thus by Property 1, f {ω} g = h {ω} g for all f, g, h ∈ A. If S({ω} ↑ ) ≺ S, then ω / ∈ S. Thus, in this case the result follows from above arguments.
"⇒": Suppose to the contrary that f {ω} g ∼ S h {ω} g for all f, g, h ∈ A but ω is Snonnull and ω ∈ S. ω being S-nonnull and ω ∈ S means that f {ω} ↑ g S h {ω} ↑ g for some f, g, h ∈ A. Since ω ∈ S, f {ω} ↑ g(ω ) = f {ω} g(ω ) and h {ω} ↑ g(ω ) = h {ω} g(ω ) for all ω ∈ S. By Property 6, f {ω} ↑ g ∼ S f {ω} g and h {ω} ↑ g ∼ S h {ω} g. From Property 1 follows f {ω} g S h {ω} g, a contradiction.
A.5 Proofs of Theorems 1 and 2
The proofs follows essentially Fishburn (1970, Chapter 13.1 and 13.2). We point out minor differences along the way. We present the proofs of both results side-by-side so that the interested reader can compare the differences. Moreover, this presentation helps to minimize redundancies.
First we show the following representation results in terms of state-dependent utilities or additively separable utilities.
Proposition 4 { S } S∈S satisfies Properties 1 to 3 and 6 if and only if there exists a collection of functions {u S : X × S −→ R} S∈S such that for all S ∈ S and f, g ∈ A, f S g if and only if
Moreover, if {v S : X × S −→ R} S∈S is another collection of functions satisfying formula (2), then for each S ∈ S there exist constants a S ∈ R ++ and b S ∈ R such a S u S (·, ω)
Proposition 5 { S } S∈S satisfies Properties 1 to 3 and 6 if and only if there exists a collection of functions {w S : X × Ω −→ R} S∈S such that for all S ∈ S and f, g ∈ A,
Moreover, if {z S : X × Ω −→ R} S∈S is another collection of functions satisfying formula (3), then for each S ∈ S there exist constants a S ∈ R ++ and b S ∈ R such a S w S (·, ω)
Proofs of Propositions. Under Properties 1 to 3 and 6, the existence of a collection of functions
and U S being affine, i.e.,
follows from applying the Mixture-Space Theorem (Herstein and Milnor, 1953 , see also Fishburn, 1970 , Section 8.4) for each S ∈ S. Moreover, for each S ∈ S, U S is unique up to positive affine transformations. We want to show that for f ∈ A,
for some function u S : X × S −→ R for every S ∈ S.
We want to show that for f ∈ A,
for some function w S : X × Ω −→ R for every S ∈ S. The next step in the proof of Proposition 4 differs slightly from the Anscombe-Aumann approach.
We claim that Property 6 implies that
To see the claim, number states in S by 1, ..., |S|, and observe that for any ω ∈ S,
Hence Property 6 implies the claim.
We claim
To see the claim, number states in Ω by 1, ..., |Ω|, and observe that for any ω ∈ S,
By equations (4) and (5), we have
For f ∈ A,
Summing over ω ∈ S and dividing by |S|, we obtain
Summing over ω ∈ Ω and dividing by |Ω|, we obtain
Comparing it with equation (10), we have
Comparing it with equation (11), we have
Combining equations (12) and (5) yields for p, q ∈ ∆(X)
Combining equations (13) and (5) yields for p, q ∈ ∆(X)
for ω ∈ Ω. For x ∈ X, let u S (x, ω) = u S (δ x , ω), with δ x being the Dirac measure with unit mass on x. Since the support of a simple probability measure is finite,
For x ∈ X, let w S (x, ω) = w S (δ x , ω), with δ x being the Dirac measure with unit mass on x. Since the support of a simple probability measure is finite,
Combining the representation in formula (4) with equation (18) yields inequality (2) for f, g ∈ A.
Repeat this construction for each S ∈ S.
Combining the representation in formula (4) with equation (19) yields inequality (3) for f, g ∈ A.
Repeat this construction for each S ∈ S. Uniqueness up to positive linear transformations follows from the uniqueness of U S . If v S (·, ω) satisfies formula (2) in place of u S (·, ω), then
V S = a S U S + b S , and a S > 0. Holding f (ω )(x) fixed for all ω ∈ S, ω = ω, it then follows that v S (·, ω) = a S (ω)u S (·, ω) + b S (ω). This holds for each ω ∈ S.
Uniqueness up to positive linear transformations follows from the uniqueness of U S . If z S (·, ω) satisfies formula (3) in place of w S (·, ω), then
Z S = a S U S + b S , and a S > 0. Holding f (ω )(x) fixed for all ω ∈ Ω, ω = ω, it then follows that z S (·, ω) = a S (ω)w S (·, ω) + b S (ω). This holds for each ω ∈ Ω. Note that u S (·, ω) is constant on X if and only if ω ∈ S is S-null. To see this, ω ∈ S being Snull means (with some slight abuse of notation) x {ω} ↑ g ∼ S g for all x ∈ X and g ∈ A, which is equivalent by formula (4) to U S (x {ω} ↑ g) = U S (g) for all x ∈ X and g ∈ A.
|S| U S (g) which is independent of x and thus constant in x.
Note that w S (·, ω) is constant on X if and only if ω ∈ Ω is S-null or ω ∈ Ω \ S. To see this, note that by Remark 7 (Property 1 and 6) ω ∈ Ω being S-null or ω / ∈ S if and only if (with some slight abuse of notation) x {ω} g ∼ S g for all x ∈ X and g ∈ A, which is equivalent by formula (4) to U S (x {ω} ↑ g) = U S (g) for all x ∈ X and g ∈ A.
|Ω| U S (g) which is independent of x and thus constant in x.
For the converse, we prove only the nonstandard Property 6. Suppose by contradiction that we have the representation in formula (2) but Property 6 is violated. Then there exist a space S ∈ S and acts f, g ∈ A with f (ω) = g(ω) for all ω ∈ S but f S g. But this contradicts formula (2) .
For the converse, we prove only the nonstandard Property 6. Suppose by contradiction that we have the representation in formula (3) but Property 6 is violated. Then there exist a space S ∈ S and acts f, g ∈ A with f (ω) = g(ω) for all ω ∈ S but f S g. . Note that
follows from f (ω) = g(ω) for all ω ∈ S. . Note further that ω∈Ω\S x∈supp(f (ω))
= ω∈Ω\S x∈supp(g(ω)) w S (x, ω)g(ω)(x)
since as we noted earlier w S (·, ω) is constant on X for all ω ∈ Ω \ S. .
But this contradicts formula (3).
We continue with the proof of Theorems 1 and 2 respectively. Fix a space S ∈ S. By Remark 6, there exists a S-nonnull state ω
• ∈ S. Let p, q ∈ ∆(X) and let ω ∈ S be any S-nonnull state. u S (x, ω)q(x) (26) if and only if
if and only if by Proposition 4
if and only if by Property 5
if and only if by Proposition 4 w S (x, ω )q(x).
Since ω ∈ S, ω ∈ {ω} ↑ \ {ω} implies ω / ∈ S. By arguments in the proof of Proposition 5, w S (·, ω ) is constant in X. This yields inequality (34). Inequality (33) holds if and only if by Proposition 5
if and only if by Proposition 5 
For S-null states let a S (ω) = 0 since we observed in the proof of Proposition 4 that ω is S-null if and only if u S (·, ω) is constant on X.
If ω is S-null or ω ∈ Ω \ S, let a S (ω) = 0 since we observed in the proof of Proposition 5 that ω is S-null or ω ∈ Ω \ S if and only if w S (·, ω) is constant on X. Repeating this construction for every S ∈ S yields representations of Theorems 1 and 2 respectively.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 2
Suppose that Properties 1 to 6 hold. We need to show that µ S ∈ ∆(S), for S S(E) if and only if for all events F such that S(F ) = S(E) we have f F ∼ h F g for all f, g, h ∈ A.
"⇒": If µ S ∈ ∆(S) with S S(E), then for all events F with S(F ) = S(E),
for all f, g, h ∈ A. By Theorem 1, we have f F g ∼ S h F g for all events F such that S(F ) = S(E) and all f, g, h ∈ A, and S S(E).
"⇐": If for all events F with S(F ) = S(E) we have f F g ∼ h F g for all f, g, h ∈ A, then ∼=∼ S with S S(E) since otherwise it contradicts Remark 6. By Theorem 1, there exists an awareness-dependent expected utility for which equation (45) holds for all f, g, h ∈ A and F ∈ Σ such that S(F ) = S(E). Thus µ S ∈ ∆(S) with S S(E).
